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Abstract 
This article empirically investigates the role of investor sentiment as a determinant of financial contagion during crises 
periods. The focus is on developed equity markets as well as emerging equity markets during 1990-2015. By using a 
multivariate GARCH methodology, cross-equity market correlations are documented to be substantially increasing 
during financial crises. Investor sentiment is negatively related to cross-equity market correlation. This inverse 
relationship becomes even stronger during times of financial crises, indicating the existence of financial contagion. This 
finding can be motivated by loss-averse and ambiguity-averse investors in equity markets. The relationship between 
investor sentiment and cross-equity market correlation persists after controlling for trade linkages, financial linkages, 
and other macroeconomic similarities between countries. The findings are robust to changes in crises definition.  
Keywords: contagion, financial crises, investor sentiment, multivariate GARCH 
1. Introduction 
The true value of financial stability is best exposed in its absence, namely in periods of system-wide failures of financial 
markets. For example, the recent global financial crisis (GFC) has led to sharp declines in international equity markets. 
The U.S. equity market lost about 40% of its market capitalization during this crisis. One remarkable observation was 
how rapidly this country-specific shock sequentially transmitted from one market to another, around the globe. Not only 
did asset prices plunge around the globe, but the crisis also jeopardised real economic growth. 
The financial turmoil of 2007-2009 has increased the need for financial stability among investors, and policy makers 
alike. Simultaneously, cross-financial market linkages strengthened over time due to global financial integration. This 
development makes the global financial system more prone to spill-over and contagion effects, thereby increasing the 
likelihood of a financial crisis. In addition, financial markets tend to exhibit increased return co-movement during 
episodes of high market volatility (Longin & Solnik, 2001). This suggests the existence of time-varying correlations 
between financial markets. 
This suggestion poses a serious challenge for the asset management industry, regulators, and academics since the 
underlying nature of the correlation provides practical value for them. For asset managers, diversification benefits that 
can be achieved for asset portfolios are impacted by the correlation between assets. The lower the correlation between 
assets, the higher the diversification benefit and the lower the portfolio risk. In the presence of time-varying correlation, 
these diversification benefits may unsolicited fluctuate with the state of the market, leaving large asset portfolios 
exposed to cross-border – and cross-asset shocks. From the perspective of a regulator, it might be possible that a 
destabilising country-specific shock spills over through another country, thereby negatively affecting the financial 
stability. In addition, policy responses to crisis heavily depend on the nature of the transmission channel across financial 
markets. 
A challenge for academia lies in the estimation and conceptualisation of such (dynamic) asset market linkages and 
correlations between asset markets. Previous, both theoretically and empirically, researchers have taken the challenge to 
model as well as to identify contagion effects between asset markets. The theory on contagion effects, firstly, shows no 
universally acceptable definition of contagion. In general, contagion is defined as a significant increase in cross-market 
linkages after a shock (Longin & Solnik, 1995). It conveys the idea that transmission mechanism is discontinuous due 
to financial panics. In addition, the theoretical work on financial crises considers an extensive amount of reasons for 
crises to contagiously appear in clusters and identifies several transmission channels (Masson, 1999). Some models are 
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based on behavioural aspects of individuals and assume that the investor behaviour changes after a large negative shock. 
On the other hand, it can be argued that such shocks are propagated via “economic fundamentals”. 
Although there exists a certain degree of ambiguity on what contagion exactly contains, empirical work has been 
focused on measuring contagion effects using various econometric procedures. Especially this area shows sharp 
disagreement on the existence of contagion effects during crises periods. In a seminal study, King & Wadhwani (1990) 
measured contagion as a significant increase in the correlation coefficient between stock returns. Their findings suggest 
that the degree of correlation had increased after October 1987, after analysing US, UK, and Japanese equities. Lee & 
Kim (1993) extend this analysis to other major markets and provides similar results. Forbes & Rigobon (2002) argue 
that simple correlation analysis provide biased results (in presence of heteroscedasticity), in the context of financial 
contagion. Using an adjusted correlation coefficient, Forbes & Rigobon (2002) find that increases in correlation are due 
to increased interdependence, and not due to contagion. In a different fashion, Dungey & Martin (2001) estimate a 
factor model of correlation analysis, while Hartmann, Straetmans & De Vries (2004) use an extreme dependence 
measure. 
This study also accepts the challenge to investigate contagion effects between asset markets over time in order to 
provide a deeper understanding of the dynamics between equity markets. The purpose of this article is multiple. First, 
this paper models time-varying correlations by using a multivariate GARCH model to assess whether equity markets 
show increased return co-movement during 1990-2015. Second, the aim is to assess the explanatory power of investor 
sentiment in explaining financial contagion, while controlling for macroeconomic fundamentals. Earlier literature has 
been focused on examining the fundamental determinants of contagion (such as trade). For example, Syllignakis & 
Kouretas (2011) find that macroeconomic fundamentals and monetary variables have substantial explanatory power in 
explaining time-varying correlations between financial markets. Fluctuations in investor sentiment are often mentioned 
as an element that could explain financial crises (White, 1990; De Long & Shleifer, 1991). Baker & Wurgler (2006) 
document that investor sentiment systematically affects the cross-section of asset returns. Especially assets that are hard 
to arbitrage are prone to investor sentiment. Baker, Wurgler & Yuan (2012) document that investor sentiment in one 
market may affect investor sentiment through private capital flows. In addition, the authors find that high current 
sentiment predicts low future returns. Following this line of reasoning, one might argue that during financial crises, 
when current investor sentiment is low, asset prices are decreasing. Since investor sentiment is contagious, asset prices 
may decrease in other markets as well. This line of reasoning is consistent with financial contagion and hints the 
potential role of investor sentiment in explaining financial contagion. Yet, the role of investor sentiment with respect to 
contagion remains unexplored. Third, this article touches upon the question whether contagion effects are stronger in 
emerging markets than developed markets. Only Celik (2012) specifically analysed this and finds that emerging equity 
markets are more sensitive to contagion effects than developed markets.  
The main results reveal that cross-equity market correlations increase substantially during financial crises. Such 
increases can potentially be motivated by changes in fundamentals (interdependence) and by changes in investor 
behaviour (contagion). This article documents that the latter motivation explains increases in cross-equity market 
correlations during periods of financial crises. This finding persists after the inclusion of a broad set of control variables, 
allowing for endogenously determined crises periods, and the use of left tail dependence instead of correlations. These 
results are weaker for the sovereign bond market, where it is documented that the role of investor sentiment in 
explaining sovereign bond correlations is limited. However, changes in correlations between equity markets (and also 
for the sovereign bond market) is not solely driven by financial contagion. Common random shocks and 
interdependence do also exhibit explanatory power. It is documented that the Fed fund rate, the U.S. Terms of Trade, 
and exchange volatilities are negatively related to the dynamic conditional correlations. Lastly, there is not sufficient 
evidence in favour of stronger contagion effects in emerging markets. Only during the GFC, it is found that contagion 
effects between the U.S. and emerging equity markets are significantly stronger than contagion effects between the U.S. 
and developed equity markets.  
The outline of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2the related literature is presented, in conjunction with the 
hypotheses of interest. Section 3 elaborates on the data analysed during this research project. Section 4 elaborates on the 
research methodology that has been deployed. Section 5 presents the results and the corresponding economic 
interpretation. Section 6 is centred on robustness checks. Section 7 offers conclusive and reflective remarks. 
2. Literature Overview 
This section shortly addresses the theoretical causes and transmission of contagion. The set of theoretical work can be, 
broadly speaking, divided into a set of “fundamental” theories and a set of “behavioural” theories. These two sets of 
theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The first set of theories assume that transmission mechanisms are the 
same during a crisis as during more stable periods. Thus, cross-market linkages do not change after a shock according to 
these theories. In that case, financial crises resulting from interdependency should be predictable using macroeconomic 
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fundamentals. On the other hand, behavioural theories aim to explain why transmission channels change during volatile 
periods and thus why contagion occurs. Any test of contagion should be supportive of the latter set of theories. 
Afterwards, an empirical literature review will be provided with respect to the quantification of contagion effects in 
financial markets. This article draws clear-cut testable predictions from both the theoretical as well as the empirical 
literature. 
2.1 Theoretical Overview 
2.1.1 Fundamental Causes 
Fundamental theories stress out that spill-over effects result from the interdependence among economies. Thus, 
transmission channels after a shock do not differ significantly than before shock. Cross-market correlations are rather a 
persistency of linkages that existed even before the shocks. Shocks will be transmitted across economies due to real and 
financial linkages between these economies.  
The most obvious form of interdependence between markets is caused by trade linkages. First, given high levels of 
bilateral trade between two trade partners, an adverse shock in one country is likely to affect its trading partners, via the 
loss of competitiveness and through the fall in demand in the country where the adverse shock was initiated (Gerlach & 
Smets, 1995). The trading partner may experience crashes in asset prices, significant capital outflows or become the 
target of a speculative attack because investors predict a deterioration in the trade accounts of an economy. Another 
trade linkage is third-market competition, whereby a financial crisis in one country is contagious to other countries that 
export to the same third market. Lastly, interdependence may occur due to competitive devaluation. In this scenario, an 
economy loses competitiveness when the currency of a major trading partner is devalued. Such devaluations may 
especially put pressure on economies that have pegged currencies. Regulators and policy-makers may attempt to restore 
the competitiveness of an economy by also devaluing its currency, in response to the initial devaluation. If investors 
predict that such strategic interactions are probable, they are likely to withdraw capital from these countries. Thereby 
bringing a fall in asset prices and further declination in the currency value. Eventually, this may trigger a crisis. 
Fundamental causes also include shocks that are transmitted through financial linkages. Financial linkages stem from 
the process of increasing globalisation as countries try to be more economically integrated with global financial markets, 
thereby causing a higher level of interdependencies. The first linkage is the “common lender” effect, which was 
proposed by Kaminsky & Reinhart (2000). It asserts that a country that shares a common lender as a country struck by a 
crisis is more likely also to experience a crisis. The crisis in the latter country creates a need to reassess and rebalance 
the overall risk exposure of the creditor’s asset portfolio. The former country might face withdrawal and retrenchment 
from these common creditors induced by a crisis in the latter country. The second financial linkage is the cross-border 
capital flow between two countries. Similar to multilateral trade, more capital flows between economies lead directly to 
more interdependence. 
Lastly, common random shocks is often mentioned as a fundamental cause. A common random shock is a change in the 
global economic environment, which adversely impacts the fundamentals of several countries simultaneously. For 
example, variation in the U.S. interest rate adversely affected the funding of emerging market economies, potentially 
resulting in a crisis in some of these economies (Moser, 2003). In addition, the strengthening of the U.S. dollar against 
the yen in 1995-1996 has been shown to play a significant role in the weakening of East-Asian economies and its crisis 
in 1997-1998 (Corsetti et al. 1999). Such commonalities lead to co-movement of asset prices or capital flows in those 
affected economies such that cross-country correlations could increase. Therefore, proxies for common random shocks 
(such as oil prices) may to explain variation in the correlation between two equity indices. Such evidence would favour 
interdependence rather than contagion.  
2.1.2 Behavioural Causes 
Behavioural theories pertain the transmission of financial crises which is not attributable to observed disruptions in 
macroeconomic or other fundamental variables. These theories argue that such transmission is solely due to investor 
behaviour of financial agents. This type of contagion is often said to be the result of irrational behaviour, such as 
financial panic, herding behaviour, and investor sentiment. Several theories explain investor-based contagion from 
different angles and can be classified into three groups: multiple equilibria, liquidity problems, and herding behaviour. 
Below the latter two groups are discussed. 
With respect to liquidity shocks, Goldfajn & Valdes (1997) propose a theoretical model whereby a crisis in a country 
may reduce the liquidity of market participants. This results in investors recomposing their portfolio of financial assets 
and sell assets in other markets in order to satisfy margin calls, or to meet regulatory requirements. If the liquidity shock 
is large enough, a crisis in one country may increase the extent of credit rationing and force investors to sell their 
holdings in other countries that were not affected by the initial crisis. Brunnermeier & Pedersen (2008) show that 
funding liquidity and market liquidity are mutually reinforcing and might induce liquidity spirals during crises periods. 
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Traders become reluctant to take on positions when funding liquidity is low, which in turn lowers market liquidity, 
leading to higher price sensitivity. When investors do not meet their margin calls, they will sell their assets. Since 
liquidity is low, the prices of these assets drop substantially, thereby decreasing the value of these assets in other 
portfolios. This results in other investors selling assets to meet their margin requirements, thus creating a negative spiral 
of fire-sales. Kodres & Pritsker (2002) explain financial market contagion using a rational expectation model of asset 
prices. In this model, the long-run value of assets is determined by systematic risks and country-specific factors. 
According to Kodres & Pritsker (2002), contagion occurs when informed investors act, due to the arrival of private 
information on a country-specific factor, by rebalancing the exposure of portfolios to the shared macroeconomic risks in 
other countries. In the other countries, uninformed investors are not able to identify the source of the change in the asset 
demand. Thus, these investors rebalance as if the information is related to the own country-specific factor. That being 
said, an idiosyncratic shock generates excess co-movement across countries’ asset markets. The model, empirically, 
implies that economies with larger liquid markets should be more vulnerable to contagion. Small and illiquid markets 
are likely to have a lower weight in international portfolios and are thereby shielded from contagion as generated in the 
model of Kodres & Pritsker (2002).  
Lastly, explanations for financial contagion are based on herding behaviour of investors. Uninformed investors 
frequently make investment decisions based on the actions of others, causing rational herding behaviour. In a seminal 
paper, Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer & Welch (1992) model mass behaviour due to informational cascades. According to 
the authors, information cascade arises when it is optimal for an agent, after observing another agent ahead of him, to 
follow the behaviour of the agent ahead of him without any regard to the own information of the individual. These 
cascades occur under mild conditions and often will go in the wrong direction. In these cases, a few early individuals 
have a disproportionate impact on others. The decisions of others in itself may reflect private information and that 
individuals also consider the decisions of other people. Under sequential decision making, there exists a herding 
externality with a positive feedback loop. If agents join the crowd, there is more incentive for outsiders to join the 
crowd too. The decisions of the first few decision makers, which are not per se correct, determine where the crowd 
forms and grows, thereby amplifying the impact of the decision made by the initial individuals.  
Devenow & Welch (1996) argue that herding is an irrational phenomenon. They propose that investors disregard their 
own information set and follow others due to an intrinsic preference for conformity with the market consensus and 
certainty. Christie & Huang (1995) argue that herding behaviour is more pronounced during market stress and extreme 
market return movements. In times of uncertainty, following the market consensus reduces the concern of making 
incorrect decisions. This suggests that behavioural herding patterns play a role in explaining financial crisis. Chiang & 
Zheng (2010) study herding behaviour in global stock markets. The evidence shows that a financial crisis induces 
herding behaviour, which in turn produces contagion effects. Thus, herding behaviour drives contagion effects. Another 
documentation is that herding behaviour is more likely in emerging markets in comparison with developed markets 
(Economou, Kostakis & Philippas, 2011; Celik, 2012). The relative lack of transparency, weak reporting requirements, 
lower accounting standards, lax enforcements of regulations, and costly information acquisition inevitably lead to 
herding behaviour in emerging markets. This raises the following hypothesis: 
Contagion effects are stronger in emerging markets 
Hwang & Salmon (2009) propose a model which incorporates the interaction between sentiment and herding to show 
that herding activity increases with (global) sentiment. According to the authors, individual asset returns decrease when 
market-wide sentiment is lower, regardless of systematic risk. There exist several channels through which financial 
contagion due to investor sentiment occurs. One, pessimistic international investors may sell-off securities from 
different markets simultaneously, thereby rapidly declining prices across markets. Second, sentiment in a foreign market 
affects sentiment in the domestic market directly due to herding behaviour of noise traders, through which market prices 
are affected. It is documented that "word-of-mouth" social interactions can affect sentiment and investment decisions 
(Brown, Ivkovic, Smith & Weisbenner, 2008). Therefore, it is likely that proxies for investor sentiment might drive 
contagion. Baker, Wurgler & Yuan (2012) investigate whether sentiment is contagious across countries. The absolute 
value of U.S. capital flows with other countries is used to obtain cross-sectional variation in the extent of integration 
between these markets. They do not only find that local and global sentiment predict the cross-section of those 
countries' returns, but also that capital flows appear to be one mechanism by which sentiment spreads across markets 
and affects global sentiment. These findings imply that any quantifications of return comovement between equity 
markets should (partially) be driven by proxies for investors. Therefore, the following hypothesis will be tested as well. 
Contagion is driven by proxies for investor sentiment during crises periods. 
However, it is challenging to distinguish both conceptually and empirically whether contagion occurs due to 
innovations in the fundamentals of a country or to changes in investor behaviour. 
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2.2 Econometric Overview 
Testing for contagion implies a number of econometric challenges, especially with respect to the identification and 
empirical conceptualisation of contagion. The simplest methodology is static correlation analysis.A significant increase 
in the correlation in returns between two markets after a shock can be interpreted as an increase in the transmission 
mechanism between the two markets, indicating the occurrence of contagion. In a seminal study, King & Wadhwani 
(1990) measured contagion as a significant increase in the correlation coefficient between stock returns. These authors 
find that the degree of correlation had increased after October 1987, after analysing US, UK, and Japanese equities. Lee 
& Kim (1993) find evidence of the existence of contagion in twelve major stocks markets after the 1987 U.S. stock 
market crash. On average, the correlation increased from 0.23, before the crash, to 0.39 after the crash. Calvo et. Al 
(1996) document a significant increase in the correlation between stock prices and in Asian and Latin-American 
countries. Correlations during calm periods were significantly lower than the correlations in crisis periods in debt 
markets, and currencies markets. All these researchers provide evidence that shocks originating from one market can be 
transmitted to other markets, resulting in a source of substantial financial instability and turmoil. Therefore, the last 
hypothesis of this paper is as follows: 
Cross-market correlations between equity markets increase substantially during crisis periods. 
To test this hypothesis, correlation analysis will be used as an intuitive starting point. However, this article will rely on 
more advance methodologies as simple correlation analysis has severe limitations. First, static correlations are biased 
upwards in presence of heteroscedasticity (Forbes & Rigobon, 2002). Second, correlation tests may not be reliable when 
it comes to assessing the stability of a dependence structure (Rodriguez, 2007). Third, static correlations do not take 
volatility continuously into account, while time-varying volatility can be perceived as a stylized fact of stock returns 
(Tse & Tsui, 2002). Fourth, the use of correlations as dependence measures is only justified for multivariate normal 
distributions. It is generally accepted that financial time series do not meet the criteria of multivariate normality, causing 
correlations to fail to reveal the underlying dependence structure.  
By now, it is well accepted that correlation analysis needs further refinements in order to estimate contagion effects. 
One strand of literature focuses on stochastic modelling of time-varying volatility processes in financial time series 
using GARCH class specifications. Such specifications allow capturing the dynamic nature of the contemporaneous 
correlation coefficient.  Several parsimonious multivariate GARCH specifications have been used in the literature. 
Longin & Solnik (1995) were among one of the first to apply a multivariate GARCH model in the context of modelling 
cross-market linkages. Using monthly excess returns for seven major economies over the period 1960-1990, the authors 
show that the international correlation matrices are time-varying and that the correlations have been increasing in times 
of crises. Engle & Sheppard (2001) developed the DCC-GARCH (Dynamic conditional correlation – GARCH) to 
examine time-varying correlations. DCC-GARCH is able to directly adjust the correlation for time-varying volatility 
continuously. Chiang, Jeon & Li (2007) and Celik (2012) both utilise the DCC-GARCH to estimate time-varrying 
correlations between financial markets. Both studies find support for contagion as measured by increase correlations 
during financial crises. In this article, the DCC-GARCH will also be adopted. 
3. Data 
3.1 Stock Market Returns 
In order to provide a measure of comovement over time, first the stock market returns needs to be defined. The sample 
consists of monthly dollar denominated stock market index returns retrieved from Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
Monthly returns are defined as 𝑟𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑡) − 𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑡−1). There are 11 countries in the sample, consisting of seven 
developed countries and four other emerging markets (as classified by Dow Jones): The United States of America (US, 
S&P 500), Germany (DE, DAX), France (FR, CAC 40), United Kingdom (UK, FTSE 100), Japan (JP, Nikkei 225), 
Netherlands (NL, AEX) and Canada (CN, TSX). The emerging markets consist of China (SSE composite), Russia 
(MICEX), India (NSE), and Mexico (MEXBOL). The sample spans the period from January 1, 1990, till September 30, 
2015. It covers known episodes of global crisis and contagion periods, such as the Asian Flu (1997), the Russian crisis 
(1998), the Dot-com bubble (2001), the GFC (2007), and the European debt crisis (2009). Due to limited data 
availability, the sample for China and Russia starts in 1/1/1991 and 22/9/1997 respectively. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the examined stock market index returns. There is some variation in the 
average monthly return, with Japan exhibiting the lowest return (-19.9%) and China the highest (101.5%). A notable 
observation is the dispersion in the standard deviation between emerging markets and developed countries. The former 
group has a larger standard deviation. This possible could imply that emerging markets are more prone to contagion. All 
countries face negative skewness, implying fat left tails. The null hypothesis of normality is rejected in all cases, using 
the Shapiro Wilk test. Most countries do not exhibit significant autocorrelations, as indicated by the Ljung-Box test 
statistic. The null hypothesis of no ARCH effects is rejected for all countries, except China. Table 1 also provides some 
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preliminary support for the hypothesis that the correlation between two equity markets increases during crises periods. 
During periods of crises, the correlation (between the U.S. stock market and other markets) increases. It seems to be that 
the change in correlations is larger for emerging markets, compared to developed markets. Lastly, note that the level of 
the correlation for emerging markets is substantially lower than for developed countries, on average.  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Index (Country) From Min Max Mean SD SW LB(10) ARCH(5) 𝜌𝑛𝑐 𝜌𝑐 
S&P 500 (U.S.) 1/1/1990 -0.186 0.106 0.005 0.042 0.967*** 7.255 33.214*** - - 
DAX 30 (Germany) 1/1/1990 -0.286 0.216 0.005 0.067 0.956*** 7.541 17.164*** 0.710 0.839 
CAC 40 (France) 1/1/1990 -0.247 0.143 0.003 0.061 0.979*** 12.021 27.254*** 0.708 0.834 
FTSE 100 (U.K.) 1/1/1990 -0.211 0.131 0.003 0.048 0.985*** 6.250 32.816*** 0.734 0.846 
AEX 25 (Netherlands) 1/1/1990 -0.316 0.151 0.004 0.061 0.938*** 5.619 36.431*** 0.718 0.846 
NIKKEI 225 (Japan) 1/1/1990 -0.199 0.245 -0.002 0.065 0.989*** 13.293 36.665*** 0.412 0.663 
TSX (Canada) 1/1/1990 -0.320 0.187 0.003 0.057 0.944*** 9.812 11.124*** 0.741 0.843 
SSE Comp. (China) 1/1/1991 -0.485 1.015 0.010 0.131 0.813*** 16.135* 7.003 0.065 0.397 
MICEX (Russia) 22/9/1997 -1.043 0.348 0.001 0.120 0.824*** 34.416*** 31.889*** 0.402 0.672 
NSE (India) 1/1/1991 -0.369 0.356 0.005 0.093 0.976*** 8.947 17.479*** 0.223 0.725 
MEXBOL (Mexico) 1/1/1990 -0.461 0.198 0.009 0.092 0.926*** 18.802*** 23.888*** 0.536 0.818 
The table presents the summary statistics for the stock market indices in the dataset, using monthly return series. 
“From" is the start date of the return series of a particular index. “SD” denotes the standard deviation. “SW” denotes the 
Shapiro-Wilk test statistic for non-normality. “LB” denotes the Ljung-Box statistic for autocorrelation with 10 lags. 
"ARCH" is Engle's test for Arch effects. 𝜌𝑛𝑐 denotes the correlation during non-crises periods between the S&P500 and 
the equity market from the j’th row. Likewise, 𝜌𝑐  shows the correlation during crises periods. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The data ends 30/9/2015. 
3.2 Investor Sentiment 
To test whether contagion in stock indices returns is driven by investor sentiment, several proxies are utilized as investor 
sentiment is not directly observable. First of all, Baker & Wurgler's investor sentiment index (2006) is used to identify 
investor sentiment on a monthly frequency. Data is retrieved from the website of Jeffrey Wurgler. This composite index 
equals the first principal component extracted from six indirect measures of U.S. focused investor sentiment: trading 
volume (NYSE turnover), dividend premium, closed-end fund discount, the P/E ratio, the equity share in new issues, the 
number of IPOs, and their first-day returns. Specifically, the orthogonalized sentiment index is deployed which is free from 
business cycle related variations. Therefore, this sentiment index is expected to be uncorrelated with macroeconomic 
fundamentals. Positive values of this index are associated with a high level of investor sentiment.  
However, Baker & Wurgler's index is an indirect measure of investor sentiment. The investor sentiment indicator from 
the American Association of Individual Investors (AAII) offers a more direct measure to capture investor sentiment. 
This metric is directly obtained from the investors that participate in the weekly AAII's survey on their expectations 
pertaining the stock market performance in the next six months. The sentiment survey provides three 
variables, 𝐵𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑡, 𝐵𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡, and 𝑁𝐸𝑈𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐿𝑡, which measures the proportion of individual investors who are bullish, 
bearish, and neutral on the U.S. stock market, respectively. 𝑁𝐸𝑈𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐿𝑡 is excluded in the regression analysis to avoid 
perfect multicollinearity.  
Lastly, the CBOE's Volatility Index of the S&P 500 (VIX) is used as a proxy of investor sentiment. The VIX index is a 
measure of implied volatility, which is the expectation of the volatility for the S&P500 over the next 30 days. The VIX 
index is perceived as a leading barometer of investor sentiment in global capital markets, and is often referred as the 
"fear index". This index is obtained from Datastream. 
3.3 Control Variables 
Several control variables are used in order to distinguish contagion from interdependence. Oil and gold price returns are 
used as proxies for common random shocks since any change in these prices affects all countries simultaneously (Edison, 
2003). In addition, the overnight discount rate of the FED is used as a proxy for the international interest rate. The 
international interest rate is a determinant of international capital flows. Countries that depend on these flows are sensitive 
to changes in the international interest rate, which may give rise to triggering a financial crisis (Frankel & Rose, 1996). 
Monthly import and export flows (in USD) between the U.S. and all other countries are obtained from the Direction of 
Trade Statistics of the IMF to account for trade linkages. Rather than using the current account, separating export flows 
and import flows allows to reveal a more detailed description of the source of time-varying cross-equity market 
correlations. For each country, the monthly change in import from / export to the U.S. is calculated by using a 
log-transformation. To directly take the relative competitive advantage due to relative price changes into account, the 
Terms of Trade (ToT) of the U.S. relative to all other countries will be used. A loss in competitiveness may deteriorate 
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the current account and thereby hurt the real sector. Lastly, to take competitive devaluation into account, (conditional) 
exchange rate volatilities are obtained via a GARCH(1,1) model. Unstable exchange rates are partially due to strategic 
and competitive devaluations between countries. Lower exchange rate volatility is therefore expected to be associated 
with higher co-movement between markets. In addition, from a financial perspective, investors price currency risk, 
which is determined by (expected) exchange rate volatility. Exchange rate changes alter the return a foreign investor's 
yields in terms of domestic currency. However, if currency volatility is lower, the costs of rebalancing portfolios is 
lower. This implies a higher co-movement of equity markets as well. Monthly exchanges rates relative to the USD are 
obtained from Datastream for the countries in the sample. For European countries, the exchange rates are corrected for 
the introduction of the Euro.  
To control for macroeconomic similarities, monthly inflation rates (via the CPI) and industrial production growth data 
for each country is obtained. The inflation rate is likely to be correlated with high nominal interest and may proxy 
macroeconomic mismanagement, which negatively affects the real sector and the banking system (Semlali, Collyns, 
2002). Negative growth in the industrial production may induce a crisis in the real sector which precedes financial crises 
(Edison, 2002). 
For each country, the monthly aggregate sales (purchase) flows of bonds and stocks, to (from) that corresponding 
country, to U.S. citizens is identified. These monthly aggregates (expressed in billion dollars) are obtained from the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury. The reason to utilise these variables is that they are indicators of cross-border capital flows 
and foreign participation in the U.S. financial market. These variables thereby contribute to financial linkages (through 
cross-border capital flows) and financial integration (through domestic participation) simultaneously. High values of 
these flows are associated with a higher level of interdependence between financial markets, due to increased financial 
integration. The M2 supply growth is used as a simple proxy for funding liquidity, which is the ease at which funding is 
obtained. High levels of growth in M2 may lead to excess funding liquidity, thereby amplifying the growth of asset 
bubbles. Monthly M2 data is obtained from all corresponding domestic central bank from the countries in the sample. 
For European countries, the time series are adjusted for their contribution to the ECB's M2 supply after the EMU. Lastly, 
the liquidity factor of Pastor & Stambaugh (2003) is used as a proxy of U.S. market liquidity, which is the ease at which 
assets are traded. This factor is based on order flows and expected return reversals. According to Brunnermeier & 
Pedersen (2008) funding - and market liquidity are important drivers of bubbles and crashes. 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Modelling Co-Movement between Equity Markets  
The DCC GARCH model is used to estimate time-varying correlation between markets. In such models, the conditional 
variances and covariances of the residuals follow an ARMA-structure. A nonlinear combination of univariate GARCH 
models with time-varying cross-equation weights is used to compute the conditional covariance matrix of the residuals. 
Thus, by employing the DCC GARCH model, one is able to capture the information of time-varying characteristics of 
the correlation matrix. In addition, the DCC GARCH model offers several benefits. Firstly, the DCC GARCH estimates 
correlation coefficients of the standardised residuals, thereby accounting for heteroscedasticity directly. Moreover, the 
model offers flexibility in the mean equation to specify the model correctly. Lastly, and most importantly, it allows to 
examining multiple asset returns simultaneously in a parsimonious manner. In a single representation, multiple 
pair-wise correlations coefficient series can be obtained through this methodology. Let the multivariate return equation 
be specified in each separate equation, as: 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝑋𝑡𝛽 + 𝜀𝑡, 𝜀𝑡|Ω𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝐻𝑡) 
Where 𝑅𝑡 represents a 𝑛 × 1vector with the 𝑖’th element denoting the 𝑖’th dependent variable corresponding to the 
𝑖’th equation. 𝛽 represents a 𝑘 × 1 vector of parameters, and 𝑋𝑡 denotes a 𝑛 × 𝑘 data-matrix. The multivariate 
conditional variance is modelled as 𝐻𝑡 = 𝐷𝑡𝑅𝑡𝐷𝑡. Estimating 𝐻𝑡 involves a two-step estimation procedure. 𝐷𝑡 is a 
𝑛 ×  𝑛 diagonal matrix containing time-varying standard deviations (√ℎ𝑖𝑖,𝑡) on its diagonals. Each time-varying 
standard deviation comes from a univariate GARCH model in the first step of the estimation procedure. In the second 
step, each equity index return residual 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 is rescaled by its time-varying standard deviation from step one, which 
provides a parameters 𝛾𝑖,𝑡. 𝛾𝑖,𝑡 in turn is used to estimate the conditional time-varying covariance matrix of 𝛾𝑡. The 
evolution of this time-varying covariance matrix is given by: 
Σ𝑡 = (1 − 𝜆1 − 𝜆2)Σ
∗ + 𝜆1𝛾𝑡−1𝛾𝑡−1
𝑇 + 𝜆2Σ𝑡−1,     𝜆1 + 𝜆2 < 1 
Σ𝑡 is a 𝑛 ×  𝑛 time-varying covariance matrix of 𝛾𝑡, and Σ
∗is the expected value of the outer product of 𝛾𝑡. Σ𝑡 can 
be rescaled into a time-varying correlation matrix Pt by simply observing that 𝑃𝑡 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(Σ𝑡)
−
1
2Σ𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(Σ𝑡)
−
1
2. The 
aim is to estimate this matrix 𝑃𝑡. In this paper, for each country, the time-varying correlation between the corresponding 
equity market and the U.S. equity market is estimated. In the mean equation, a constant-only model will be specified for 
simplicity. In the variance equation, a 𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻(2,2) structure is specified. Student's T-distribution will be used in the 
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log-likelihood function, thereby taking the fat tails into account. 
4.2 Seemingly Unrelated Regression  
To analyse the determinants and the dynamics of the estimated dynamic conditional correlations, the following general 
system of equations is estimated through the use of seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) since dynamic conditional 
correlations are likely to be contemporaneously correlated.  
𝜌
𝑖𝑗,𝑡
= 𝛼𝑖𝑗 + 𝜓1,𝑖𝑗𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 𝜓2,𝑖𝑗𝐵𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡 + 𝜓3,𝑖𝑗𝐵𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝑇 𝛾𝑖𝑗 + ∑𝛿𝑖𝑗,𝑡𝑑𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗,𝑡 
Where 𝜌𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is the dynamic conditional correlation between country 𝑖and the U.S. at time 𝑡. 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 denotes Baker and 
Wurgler's sentiment indicator. 𝐵𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡 and 𝐵𝑈𝐿𝑡 are AAII's bearish and bullish sentiment indicator. The neutral 
indicator is excluded to overcome perfect multicollinearity. 𝑋𝑖𝑗,𝑡
𝑇 is a matrix consisting of the control variables. ∑𝛿𝑖𝑗,𝑡𝑑𝑡 
is a set of time dummies, also including the NBER recession time dummy. In SUR, the larger the contemporaneous 
correlation between the errors(𝜖𝑖𝑗,𝑡), the larger is the information gain of FGLS compared to OLS (Moon & Perron, 
2006). This will result in SUR being more efficient than OLS. Contemporaneous correlation is assessed by the 
Breusch-Pagan LM test.  
To test hypothesis 3, the SUR regression is estimated only with time dummies. First, the NBER time dummy is simply 
used. Afterwards, separate time dummies are employed for each different crisis in the sample, including the Mexican 
peso crisis (1994), the Asian currency crisis (1997), the Russian rubble crisis (1998), the Dot-com Bubble (2000), the 
GFC (2007) and the European debt crisis (2010). This will not only allow to assess whether cross market correlations 
increase substantially during crisis periods, but also provide insight whether this change differs by crisis. Furthermore, 
these separate time dummies are merged to one new time dummy (𝐷𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆,𝑡) which denotes whether a crisis occurred 
in month 𝑡. This dummy will be used in the further analysis unless specified otherwise. To test hypothesis 2, the full 
SUR equation is estimated with all variables of interests and control variables. To test hypothesis 1, the coefficients of 
the sentiment indicators will be tested for joint equality during crisis periods. If these effects do differ across developed 
and emerging markets, there is evidence in favour of hypothesis 1. 
5. Results 
Figure 1 shows the predicted in-sample dynamic conditional correlation between the U.S. and all other developed 
markets (left), and between the U.S. and all emerging markets (right). There are three striking patterns, in both figures, 
that can be observed. First, the correlation between the U.S. and other countries increases during known episodes of 
high financial stress. An increase in the correlations can be observed for each pair in the period between 2000-2003 and 
2008-2009. These episodes correspond to the Dot-Com bubble and the GFC. Between the U.S. and European countries, 
an increase can be observed around 2013, consistent with the European sovereign debt crisis. Second, there seems to be 
an upward trend in the time-varying correlations over time. This observation is consistent with the financial integration 
of markets over time. Lastly, there exists heterogeneity in these correlations across the pairs. European countries, 
Canada, and Mexico, have a higher level of correlation with U.S. in general. Again, this finding is consistent with the 
high interdependence between these countries and the U.S. For the emerging markets, the level of correlations seem to 
be lower. These figures suggest that the DCC-GARCH estimates are able to capture dynamic correlations that are 
consistent with historical events and patterns. 
 
Figure 1. Time-varying correlation estimates  
Table 2 (see appendix) provides the SUR estimates of three different dummy-variable regressions for each correlation 
pair with the US. In model 1, the dynamic correlations are regressed on a constant and the NBER time 
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dummy (𝐷𝑁𝐵𝐸𝑅,𝑡). Model (2) uses six different time dummies corresponding to the dates of six financial crisis. Model 
(3) uses one single time dummy that equals one if one of the six crisis occurred in month 𝑡. The results from model (1) 
suggest weak evidence in favour of hypothesis 3 because 𝐷𝑁𝐵𝐸𝑅,𝑡 is positive across all countries, however not always 
significant across the countries. The Germany equity market, for example, becomes significantly more correlated with 
the U.S. equity market. The correlation increases, approximately, by 6.4 percent point during NBER recessions. Yet, for 
the Netherlands, the correlation increases by an insignificant 2.1 percent point. It might be possible that the NBER 
recession dates imperfectly proxies the dates of financial crises or that the correlation between specific markets only 
increases for specific financial crises. To take the latter notion into account, Model (2) provides the estimates of the 
effect of six different crisis dummies on the dynamic conditional correlation. Indeed, the effects of crisis periods on 
correlations differ by crisis and by country. Cross-equity market correlations are mostly insignificant and negative for 
the Mexican 'Tequila' crisis and the Asian currency crisis. The correlation between U.S. equity markets and the Mexican 
equity market is significantly lower at the 1% level during the Mexican crisis. This finding, however, is not consistent 
with hypothesis 3, as a positive effect of the crisis period was expected. Possibly this has to do with the nature of the 
crisis, which occurred in the Mexican FX market and subsequently in the Mexican real sector. During this period the 
Mexican trade - and financial linkages were predominantly disrupted by the increasing volatility of the Mexican Peso 
rather than irrational causes. A similar explanation also holds for the Asian currency crisis in 1997. All other crises 
exhibit a consistent positive pattern with respect to the cross-equity market correlations. Especially the GFC and the 
European debt crisis seems to have the most consistent pattern: each dynamic conditional correlation increases 
significantly at the 1% level during these periods. Model (3) uses the aggregated time dummy. For this model, the effect 
of crisis periods on dynamic correlations is estimated to be positive and significant at the 5% for each pair. Table 3 
provides reasonable evidence in favour of hypothesis 3: cross-equity market correlations seem to increase during 
periods of high volatility. However, the estimated effect differs by crisis and country.  
In order to test whether the increase in correlations is attributable to investor sentiment, these correlations are regressed 
against four proxies of investor sentiment. In addition, interaction terms between the crisis dummy and these proxies are 
included. In this setting, contagion occurs when the effect of investor sentiment is significantly stronger during crisis 
periods. Table 3 contains the results for the three estimated equations. Equation (4) regresses the dynamic correlation on 
the NBER time dummy, investor sentiment proxies, and the interaction of sentiment with the time dummy. The results 
show that Baker & Wurgler's sentiment index has a negative effect on the dynamic correlations (for most cases) at the 1% 
significance level. This implies that high investor sentiment on the U.S. stock market is associated with lower 
correlation during non-crises periods, on average. In addition, this effect seems to be economically sizable. For instance, 
an increase of one point in the index is associated with a 12.8 percent point decrease in the dynamic correlation between 
Germany and the U.S.. For the bullish sentiment indicator, a similar finding is obtained. An increase in the proportion of 
investors that indicate to be bullish on the U.S. stock market is associated with a decrease in the dynamic correlation 
during non-crisis periods, on average. A one percentage point increase in the bullish indicator is associated with a 0.6 
percentage point decrease in the US-German dynamic correlation. Consistent with this line of reasoning, the bearish 
indicator has a significantly positive effect on the dynamic correlations in seven out of the ten cases. All three investor 
sentiment indicators seem to have a systematic effect on the dynamic correlations over time. What is more striking, is 
that this relationship seems to become stronger during periods of crisis. During crisis periods, the effect of 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 
becomes significantly more negative as indicated by the coefficients of the corresponding interaction term. In ten out of 
the eleven correlations, this effect is statistically significant at the 5% level. The hypothesis that these coefficients are 
jointly zero is rejected at the 5% level (𝐹 = 5.42). Therefore, during crisis periods, when investor sentiment is low on 
average, the dynamic correlations will increase substantially. This finding suggests that the increase in cross-equity 
market correlations is driven by investor sentiment. This evidence suggests the existence of financial contagion, since it 
represents changes in financial conditions that are likely to be driven by changes in the behaviour of investors or 
preferences unrelated to fundamentals. Model (5) replaces the NBER recession dummy with the broader crisis dummy. 
These results are quantitatively and qualitatively the same, implying that the findings of model (4) also holds when a 
different crisis specification is considered.  
These findings can be motivated by behavioural patterns. When crises unravel with the arrival of a series of negative 
news, investors with non-bayesian beliefs will negatively overreact to this news (Barberis, Shleifer & Vishny, 1998). 
This decline forces loss-averse investors to endure painful losses and deteriorate their sentiment. Thaler & Johnson 
(1990) suggest that these losses may have made investors more loss averse, resulting them to rebalance the share of 
risky assets in their portfolio and thereby causing further price declines. Such portfolios may be internationally 
diversified, thereby also inducing price declines in foreign assets. Losses can generate contagion between assets when 
those assets are held by common investors. This will result in portfolio rebalancing of loss averse foreign investors, 
creating a negative spiral. This negative spiral will result in joint losses in several markets simultaneously, thereby 
generating a higher co-movement of these markets by definition. Thus, investor overreaction can cause small negative 
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shocks to trigger market-wide panics that can spread internationally. A second explanation of the results lies in the 
"competence hypothesis" (Heath & Tversky, 1991): an individual's feeling of competency in a given situation is 
determined by what is known relative to what can be known. During crises periods, market volatility increases. This 
results in a lower competency of investor to assess the market environment and lowers investor sentiment. According to 
(Heath & Tversky, 1991) will increase ambiguity aversion of individuals. In turn, due to this increase in ambiguity 
aversion, investors are more likely to show herding behaviour. When investors exhibit pessimistic expectations on the 
market and don't feel sufficiently competent to assess the market environment, the best thing to possibly do is to follow 
the market consensus. Herding behaviour by ambiguity (and loss) averse investors will increase cross-equity market 
correlations in crisis periods. These two potential interpretations are not mutually exclusive, but rather reinforce each 
other simultaneously. 
To verify that the effect of investor sentiment on cross-equity markets is not biased, the control variables are included in 
the SUR regressions. These results of three different models can be found in table 4. For brevity, the bullish and bearish 
indicator are excluded from the analysis1. Model (6) controls for a range of variables that proxy common random 
shocks that affect all countries in the sample simultaneously, such as gold and oil returns, and the Fed Fund rate (𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑡). 
The gold – and oil return estimates are not statistically significant in any case. However, a striking finding is the 
significant (at the 1% level) negative effect of the 𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑡 on dynamic correlations. The FED especially decreases its 
base rates during a recession as an attempt to promote aggregate demand growth and interbank lending, but also induces 
higher risk-taking behaviour, not only in the domestic market per se. Furthermore, such decreases may directly cause 
capital outflows, thereby increasing financial linkages. Model (6) shows that such expansionary policy substantially 
increases all cross-equity market correlations in the sample. The coefficients of 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 in model 6 seem to be higher 
than those of model (4) and (5). This indicates that the latter estimates are downward biased and that 𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑡 and 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 
are positively correlated during non-crises periods. This is consistent with the empirical finding that an interest rate hike 
can signal a healthy economy, thereby increasing investor sentiment (Kurov, 2010). More important, in 9 out of the 10 
correlations, the hypothesis of no sentiment effect during crisis periods is rejected. Thus the evidence of financial 
contagion persists, even after controlling for common random shocks. 
Equation (7) controls for various trade-related and macroeconomic characteristics. The results show that the import - 
and export growth of the U.S. has no statistical significance in explaining the dynamic correlations. Industrial 
production and inflation rates seem not to exhibit significant explanatory power either. Exchange rate volatility has a 
significant negative effect on most of the dynamic correlations. This indicates that stable exchange rates result in higher 
cross-equity market correlations, which is consistent with financial and economic integration. In addition, the U.S. 
terms of trade (ToT) is negatively associated with dynamic correlations in most countries. A decreasing U.S. ToT 
implies that price of U.S. exports falls relative to U.S. imports. Therefore, to maintain at least the same level of imports, 
the U.S. must export more. This will increase trade linkages and economic integration between U.S. and other countries. 
In addition, consistent with the documented patterns in model (6), the estimated equation (7) in table 5 shows that 
investor sentiment remains to exhibit a significant adverse effect on the dynamic correlations during crisis periods. A 
statistically significant negative effect is found at the 1% level for most correlation time series. Thus, even after 
controlling for trade linkages and macroeconomic characteristics, the negative effect of investor sentiment on dynamic 
correlations during crises persists. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Transition probability and crises dummies for US-Germany 
                                                        
1Unreported results reveal that the inclusion of these variables provides similar results as was shown in table 3. 
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Model (8), table 4, adds several financial control variables, such as Pastor's liquidity factor (𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡), Growth of the M2 
money supply ∆𝑀2𝑖,𝑡 , stocks and bonds purchases/sales from/to the U.S. by foreign investors. In addition, an 
interaction term between 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 and 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡, and an interaction term between this liquidity factor and the crisis dummy 
is expected. When market liquidity and sentiment is low, it could be expected that pessimistic loss averse investors are 
not able to sell their assets without fire-sales (Brunnermeier & Pedersen, 2008). The results, however, show that U.S. 
the liquidity factor, has no significant effect on the dynamic correlations for any of the countries. Similarly, the growth 
of M2 money supply of the U.S. and the other countries are not significantly different from zero. Neither a statistically 
significant effect of the interaction between market liquidity and investor sentiment is documented. The effect of bond 
and stock flows from and to the U.S. are sporadically significant. In addition, the sign of the effect is not consistent 
across the countries. The coefficients of the sentiment index remain statistically significant in 9 out of the 10 cases. In 
addition, this negative effect is significantly stronger during crises periods for all countries except India and Mexico. 
Thus, the results suggest that controlling for financial linkages does not alter the documented relationship between 
investor sentiment and cross-equity market correlations. 
In sum, it is documented that cross-equity market correlations increase substantially during periods of crises. Thus 
hypothesis 3 is not rejected. Furthermore, the regressions indicate that the economically sizable and statistically significant 
negative relation between investor sentiment and dynamic conditional cross-equity market correlation persists after 
controlling for a large set of control variables. This result shows that financial contagion is driven by investor sentiment. 
Therefore, hypothesis 2 is not rejected. Despite these results, contagion is not the sole determinant of cross-equity market 
correlations. Interdependence and common shocks do play a role. Finally, the hypothesis that the coefficients of the 
interaction between sentiment and the crises dummy are greater in emerging market than developed markets is rejected for 
all models. Based on these coefficients tests, there is not sufficient evidence to accept hypothesis 1.  
6. Robustness Checks 
The choice of the sample period may give rise to a sample selection bias due to the fact that crisis months are specified 
ex post, rather than a priori. In this paper, the crisis months are specified ex-post using the time dummies. It must be 
mentioned that correctly defining the crises periods is to some degree arbitrary, even when official data sources are used. 
Fong (2003) alleviate this sample selection problem by allowing crisis states to be determined endogenously by using 
Markov regime switching models. Following these authors, two regimes of contagion risk are identified via a Markov 
switching model, which takes endogenous structural breaks into account. This allows the data to statistically determine 
the beginning and the end of each regime/crisis. Model 6-8 will be re-estimated in this Markov regime switching 
setting.  
To illustrate the added value of the Markov switching model, the smoothed transition probability of being in the volatile 
regime is shown below for US-Germany. Figure (e) reveals that the volatile regime is mostly located within the crises 
periods based on the exogenously determined time dummies. However, there some small differences. For instance, the 
length of the crises according to the smoothed probability is relatively smaller compared to the time dummies. In 
addition, the transition probabilities capture crises regimes that are not included in the time dummies, so the Markov 
switching model might provide other insights. 
Table 5 provides the Markov regime switching regression estimates for the equation that includes control variables for 
common random shocks and Baker & Wurgler's sentiment index. The upper panel provides the estimates during high 
volatility periods (crisis state), while the lower panel provides the estimates for low volatility periods (normal state). 
Similar to model (6) from, oil and gold returns do not drive dynamic conditional correlations in both states. Consistently, 
a statistically significant (at the 1% level) negative effect of the Fed Fund Rate on 10 out of the 11 dynamic conditional 
correlations, in both states. In addition, investor sentiment seems to be negatively associated in both states. However, 
this association is stronger and consistent during the high volatility regime, since all coefficients are negative and 
statistically significant. The last row of table 9 reports the 𝜒2 Wald test statistic for investor sentiment equality across 
both states. All Wald test statistics indicate that the investor sentiment coefficient differs statistically significant (at the 
5%) across the regimes for each country in the sample. This supports the second hypothesis that investor sentiment 
drives contagion during crisis periods. Lastly, the hypothesis that this effect differs for developed markets, compared to 
emerging markets, is rejected for the high volatility regime (𝐹 = 1.56). Therefore, there is not sufficient evidence to 
claim that contagion is stronger in emerging markets. Controlling for common random shocks, in a Markov regime 
switching model, does not alter the results presented in the previous section. 
Table 6 provides the Markov regression estimates for investor sentiment, controlled for trade related variables. 
Consistent with equation 7 (table 4), inflation rates, growth in industrial production, import and export growth exhibit 
no significant explanatory power with respect to dynamic conditional correlations. This finding holds across both 
regimes. The U.S. Terms of Trade and exchange rate volatility have a negative and significant effect on dynamic 
correlation for most countries in both regimes. More importantly, in line with the previous results, is that the effect of 
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investor sentiment in the volatile regime becomes significantly stronger than in the normal regime (as indicated by the 
Wald test in the last row). Furthermore, there is no evidence that contagion effects are stronger in emerging markets 
after controlling for trade related characteristics. Thus, table 6 presents results in favour of hypothesis 1 and 2. 
Table 7 presents the Markov switching regression estimates for investor sentiment, controlled for a set of financial 
characteristics. Similar to the other Markov switching regression estimates, there exists a large similarity between table 
7 and its SUR variant in table 4 (model 8). The VIX is documented to be insignificant in explaining the dynamic 
conditional correlation across each country for both regimes. A similar inference can be made for Pastor's liquidity 
factor, the interaction between liquidity and investor sentiment, and the M2 money supply growth. Furthermore, sales 
and purchases of bonds and stocks to and by U.S. citizens have no significant impact on the left tail dependence. The 
Wald test statistics indicate that the effect of investor sentiment on the dynamic correlation differs significantly by 
regime. More specifically, this effect is documented to be larger in magnitude during crises periods. This effect, 
however, is not larger for emerging markets within the volatility regime (𝐹 = 0.63). Therefore, based on this robustness 
check, the results are not qualitatively different when crisis periods are endogenously determined. A sample selection 
bias seems not to be substantial enough to becloud the initial results.  
7. Conclusion and Discussion 
The occurrence of financial crises is an unavoidable and unfortunate byproduct of our modern economic system. A 
stylized fact is that financial crashes are often clustered. Several explanations have been put forward to explain this 
stylized fact, such as interdependence and contagion. The aim of this article is to investigate the presence of contagion 
effects in equity markets during 1990-2015. Specifically, this article contributes to the literature by exploring the role of 
investor sentiment as a determinant for financial contagion. It is found that equity markets become more dependent 
during crises periods. In addition, a strong negative relationship between investor sentiment and cross-equity market 
correlations is documented, which becomes even stronger during crises periods. This finding implies the existence of 
contagion effects in equity markets. This finding persists after the inclusion of a broad set of control variables and after 
allowing for endogenously determined crises periods. 
During financial crises, when investor sentiment is low, domestic loss-averse investors will rebalance the share of risky 
assets in their portfolio and become more loss-averse. Such rebalancing may induce a declining price spiral in both the 
domestic as well as foreign market, creating a joint crash. In addition, during financial crises, investors tend to become 
more ambiguity averse. This causes them to feel less competent to assess the financial environment, resulting in herding 
behaviour. Herding behaviour, in turn, causes financial contagion. However, changes in correlations between equity 
markets is not solely driven by investor sentiment. Interdependence does also exhibit explanatory power: the Fed fund 
rate, the U.S. Terms of Trade, and exchange volatilities are negatively related to the time-varying correlations between 
equity markets.  
Some limitations, however, of this paper needs to be addressed. First, the sample consisted of major developed equity 
markets, major emerging asset markets, and a time-span of 25 years, the results might not hold in other settings that 
were not explored here. Second, and more important, is the internal validity. One possible threat to the internal validity 
is an endogeneity issue embodied as an omitted variable bias. This article deploys a large set of control variables to 
limit omitted variable bias. In addition, the orthogonalized Baker & Wurgler's sentiment index is used, which is 
uncorrelated with a large set of macro-fundamentals. Yet, the existence of unobserved heterogeneity correlated with the 
variables of interest can not be fully ruled out. In addition, there might exist an endogeneity problem in the form of a 
measurement error. No perfect proxies, without measurement error, for investor sentiment exist. To what extent 
endogeneity is problematic is unknown, but should be kept in mind.  
Irrespective of the above-mentioned limitations, the presented results provide practical implications for financial 
regulators, and practitioners in the risk - and asset management industry. First, financial practitioners should become 
aware that international diversification of asset portfolios comes at an additional cost, namely contagion risk. During 
periods of low sentiment, contagion is likely to occur, which decreases diversification benefits due to co-crashes in 
different markets. The results of this article rationalizes the local equity preference of investors. Asset managers may 
exploit such preferences through the use of domestic mutual funds since such funds are expected to exhibit lower 
contagion risk. From the perspective of policy makers, this article suggests going beyond "classical" measures to 
mitigate contagion. Traditional expansionary monetary policy, via lower base interest rates, increases the dependency 
between markets substantially, increasing the risk for contagion. A question for policy makers is how to manage 
investor sentiment to avoid herding behaviour and panic selling in times of financial crises, since our global economic 
system is both too linked to fail and too contagious to ignore.  
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Appendix  
Table 2. Seemingly unrelated regression on time-varying correlation for each country with the U.S. 
Model Variable DE FR UK NL JP CA CN RU IN MX 
(1)        𝛼 0.688*** 
(0.104) 
0.682*** 
(0.009) 
0.711*** 
(0.009) 
0.696*** 
(0.009) 
0.439*** 
(0.008) 
0.738*** 
(0.005) 
0.109*** 
(0.005) 
0.378*** 
(0.012) 
0.317*** 
(0.012) 
0.583*** 
(0.008) 
𝐷𝑁𝐵𝐸𝑅,𝑡 0.084
*** 
(0.031) 
0.047* 
(0.028) 
0.021 
(0.026) 
0.003 
(0.027) 
0.020 
(0.022) 
0.040*** 
(0.015) 
0.036*** 
(0.035) 
0.028 
(0.035) 
0.181*** 
(0.035) 
0.032 
(0.023) 
𝑅2 0.023 0.009 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.022 0.018 0.002 0.078 0.006 
(2)       𝛼 0.652*** 
(0.012) 
0.648*** 
(0.010) 
0.657*** 
(0.009) 
0.657*** 
(0.010) 
0.391*** 
(0.008) 
0.715*** 
(0.006) 
0.081*** 
(0.004) 
0.298*** 
(0.010) 
0.294*** 
(0.013) 
0.576*** 
(0.009) 
𝐷𝑀𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛,𝑡 -0.010 
(0.046) 
-0.095* 
(0.059) 
0.046 
(0.034) 
0.020 
(0.039) 
-0.056 
(0.028) 
0.006* 
(0.022) 
-0.039 
(0.016) 
-0.067* 
(0.038) 
-0.101 
(0.071) 
-0.133*** 
(0.035) 
𝐷𝐴𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛,𝑡 -0.013 
(0.043) 
-0.088** 
(0.036) 
-0.016 
(0.032) 
-0.087 
(0.036) 
-0.010 
(0.021) 
0.034 
(0.021) 
-0.053* 
(0.015) 
-0.097*** 
(0.035) 
0.037 
(0.046) 
0.051 
(0.033) 
𝐷𝑅𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑛,𝑡 0.143
*** 
(0.056) 
0.075 
(0.047) 
0.097** 
(0.042) 
0.009 
(0.047) 
0.045 
(0.034) 
0.112 
(0.027) 
0.042*** 
(0.019) 
0.175*** 
(0.046) 
-0.057 
(0.061) 
0.003 
(0.043) 
𝐷𝐷𝑜𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚,𝑡 0.068
** 
(0.031) 
0.057** 
(0.026) 
0.139*** 
(0.023) 
0.024 
(0.026) 
0.108 
(0.019) 
0.065 
(0.015) 
0.012*** 
(0.011) 
0.245*** 
(0.026) 
0.042 
(0.034) 
0.033 
(0.024) 
𝐷𝐺𝐹𝐶,𝑡 0.159
*** 
(0.035) 
0.170*** 
(0.029) 
0.132*** 
(0.026) 
0.124*** 
(0.029) 
0.142*** 
(0.022) 
0.052*** 
(0.017) 
0.118*** 
(0.011) 
0.089*** 
(0.029) 
0.300*** 
(0.038) 
0.067*** 
(0.022) 
𝐷𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡,𝑡 0.149
*** 
(0.027) 
0.177*** 
(0.022) 
0.185*** 
(0.019) 
0.178*** 
(0.022) 
0.196*** 
(0.016) 
0.075*** 
(0.013) 
0.166*** 
(0.009) 
0.361*** 
(0.022) 
0.150*** 
(0.029) 
0.040** 
(0.020) 
𝑅2 0.141 0.263 0.282 0.197 0.388 0.172 0.595 0.538 0.244 0.079 
(3)       𝛼 0.652*** 
(0.013) 
0.649*** 
(0.011) 
0.657*** 
(0.010) 
0.661*** 
(0.011) 
0.391*** 
(0.009) 
0.714*** 
(0.006) 
0.082*** 
(0.006) 
0.299*** 
(0.013) 
0.292*** 
(0.015) 
0.578*** 
(0.009) 
𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠,𝑡 0.103
*** 
(0.019) 
0.086*** 
(0.017) 
0.127*** 
(0.015) 
0.088*** 
(0.016) 
0.113*** 
(0.013) 
0.063*** 
(0.009) 
0.071*** 
(0.009) 
0.187*** 
(0.020) 
0.099*** 
(0.022) 
0.038** 
(0.018) 
𝑅2 0.086 0.071 0.197 0.086 0.198 0.137 0.171 0.226 0.059 0.005 
Model (1) only considers NBER recession dates. Model (2) considers six crises using six time dummies. Model (3) uses 
an aggregated time dummy which equals 1 if one of the 6 crises occurs in month t. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are shown between parentheses 
Table 3. Seemingly unrelated regression on time-varying correlation for each country with the U.S. 
Model Variable DE FR UK NL JP CA CN RU IN MX 
(4) 𝛼 0.278*** 
(0088) 
0.267*** 
(0.080) 
0.480*** 
(0.077) 
0.372*** 
(0.077) 
0.160* 
(0.070) 
0.696*** 
(0.044) 
-0.019 
(0.045) 
0.108 
(0.112) 
-0.220* 
(0.106) 
0.531*** 
(0.076) 
𝐷𝑁𝐵𝐸𝑅,𝑡 0.521 
(00345) 
0.351 
(0.314) 
0.111 
(0.301) 
0.275 
(0.301) 
0.104 
(0.274) 
0.158 
(0.172) 
0.095 
(0.178) 
0.057 
(0.443) 
0.62 
(0.417) 
-0.241 
(0.297) 
𝐵𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡 0.006
*** 
(0.001) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
𝐵𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑡 -0.006
*** 
(0.001) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 -0.128
*** 
(0.017) 
-0.103*** 
(0.016) 
-0.065*** 
(0.015) 
-0.107*** 
(0.015) 
-0.052*** 
(0.014) 
-0.029*** 
(0.009) 
-0.062*** 
(0.009) 
-0.057* 
(0.022) 
-0.073*** 
(0.021) 
-0.009 
(0.015) 
𝐵𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑁𝐵𝐸𝑅,𝑡 -0.008 
(0.005) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.010 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
𝐵𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑁𝐵𝐸𝑅,𝑡 -0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.000 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑁𝐵𝐸𝑅,𝑡 -0.116
*** 
(0.036) 
-0.091** 
(0.033) 
-0.089*** 
(0.032) 
-0.086*** 
(0.032) 
-0.066*** 
(0.029) 
-0.049** 
(0.018) 
-0.039** 
(0.019) 
-0.100** 
(0.046) 
-0.013 
(0.044) 
-0.031*** 
(0.007) 
𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 -0.070 
(0.047) 
-0.066 
(0.043) 
-0.018 
(0.041) 
-0.025 
(0.041) 
-0.018 
(0.038) 
-0.023 
(0.024) 
-0.016 
(0.025) 
-0.066 
(0.061) 
-0.082 
(0.057) 
-0.048 
(0.041) 
 𝑅2 0.261 0.241 0.117 0.221 0.121 0.084 0.220 0.065 0.223 0.030 
(5) 
𝛼 
0.325** 
(0.102) 
0.375*** 
(0.096) 
0.605*** 
(0.083) 
0.428*** 
(0.092) 
0.270*** 
(0.078) 
0.708*** 
(0.051) 
0.054 
(0.050) 
0.227 
(0.123) 
-0.273* 
(0.133) 
0.550*** 
(0.095) 
𝐷𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆,𝑡 0.290 
(0.157) 
0.113 
(0.147) 
0.089 
(0.128) 
0.246 
(0.141) 
0.075 
(0.119) 
0.085 
(0.078) 
-0.005 
(0.076) 
0.226 
(0.188) 
0.223 
(0.204) 
-0.063 
(0.146) 
𝐵𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡 0.004
* 
(0.002) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.002) 
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
𝐵𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑡 -0.006
*** 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003* 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 -0.209
*** 
(0.026) 
-0.132*** 
(0.026) 
-0.118*** 
(0.021) 
-0.122*** 
(0.023) 
-0.078*** 
(0.020) 
-0.050*** 
(0.013) 
-0.075*** 
(0.013) 
-0.133*** 
(0.031) 
-0.092** 
(0.033) 
-0.024 
(0.024) 
𝐵𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆,𝑡 -0.000 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.003* 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
𝐵𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆,𝑡 -0.005
* 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.005*** 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆,𝑡 -0.176
*** 
(0.030) 
-0.093*** 
(0.028) 
-0.109*** 
(0.025) 
-0.065*** 
(0.027) 
-0.061 
(0.033) 
-0.046** 
(0.015) 
-0.030* 
(0.015) 
-0.137*** 
(0.036) 
-0.055 
(0.039) 
-0.024 
(0.028) 
𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 -0.077 
(0.044) 
-0.071 
(0.041) 
-0.015 
(0.036) 
-0.023 
(0.039) 
-0.014 
(0.033) 
-0.026 
(0.022) 
-0.018 
(0.021) 
-0.057 
(0.053) 
-0.104 
(0.057) 
-0.049 
(0.041) 
𝑅2 0.3622 0.310 0.336 0.296 0.311 0.213 0.408 0.297 0.240 0.029 
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Model (4) regresses the correlations on the proxies for investor sentiment and NBER time dummy. Model (5) replaces 
the NBER time dummy by the general crises dummy. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are shown between parentheses. 
Table 4. Seemingly unrelated regression on time-varying correlation for each country with the U.S 
Model Variable DE FR UK NL JP CA CN RU IN MX 
(6)        𝛼 0.785*** 
(0.015) 
0.810*** 
(0.012) 
0.800*** 
(0.009) 
0.806*** 
(0.011) 
0.523*** 
(0.008) 
0.754*** 
(0.008) 
0.166*** 
(0.006) 
0.488*** 
(0.014) 
0.412*** 
(0.021) 
0.605*** 
(0.015) 
𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠,𝑡 0.047
** 
(0.016) 
0.038** 
(0.013) 
0.074*** 
(0.010) 
0.048*** 
(0.012) 
0.073*** 
(0.009) 
0.045*** 
(0.008) 
0.055*** 
(0.006) 
0.117*** 
(0.015) 
0.068** 
(0.022) 
0.010 
(0.016) 
𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑡 -2.797
*** 
(0.334) 
-4.120*** 
(0.262) 
-3.736*** 
(0.211) 
-3.790*** 
(0.250) 
-3.614*** 
(0.189) 
-0.876*** 
(0.172) 
-2.213*** 
(0127) 
-5.146*** 
(0.321) 
-2.924*** 
(0.464) 
-0.721** 
(0.333) 
𝑅𝑜𝑖𝑙,𝑡 0.022 
(0.075) 
0.066 
(0.059) 
0.117** 
(0.047) 
0.052 
(0.056) 
0.045 
(0.043) 
0.063 
(0.039) 
0.013 
(0.029) 
0.117 
(0.072) 
-0.137 
(0.104) 
-0.020 
(0.075) 
𝑅𝑔𝑜𝑙𝑑,𝑡 0.378
* 
(0.165) 
0.252 
(0.130) 
0.086 
(0.104) 
0.166 
(0.124) 
0.106 
(0.094) 
0.093 
(0.085) 
0.058 
(0.063) 
-0.055 
(0.159) 
0.224 
(0.230) 
0.093 
(0.165) 
𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 -0.164
*** 
(0.025) 
-0.048** 
(0.019) 
-0.029** 
(0.015) 
-0.044** 
(0.018) 
0.006 
(0.014) 
-0.029** 
(0.013) 
-0.020** 
(0.009) 
-0.010 
(0.024) 
-0.058 
(0.034) 
-0.007 
(0.024) 
𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠,𝑡 -0.161
*** 
(0.027) 
-0.054*** 
(0.021) 
-0.072*** 
(0.017) 
-0.036** 
(0.018) 
-0.024** 
(0.010) 
-0.037** 
(0.014) 
-0.000 
(0.010) 
-0.087*** 
(0.026) 
-0.037 
(0.038) 
-0.090*** 
(0.027) 
𝑅2 0.448 0.577 0.655 0.573 0.667 0.272 0.684 0.609 0.243 0.028 
(7)       𝛼 0.717*** 
(0.203) 
0.127*** 
(0.124) 
1.179*** 
(0.099) 
1.247*** 
(0.114) 
1.546*** 
(0.101) 
0.320*** 
(0.091) 
0.857*** 
(0.070) 
1.496*** 
(0.226) 
2.303*** 
(0.281) 
0.351 
(0.206) 
𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠,𝑡 0.026 
(0.015) 
0.007 
(0.010) 
0.040*** 
(0.008) 
0.014 
(0.009) 
0.038*** 
(0.009) 
0.021* 
(0.008) 
0.029*** 
(0.006) 
0.083*** 
(0.019) 
0.036 
(0.024) 
0.030 
(0.018) 
𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑈𝑆,𝑡 0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.012*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.008*** 
(0.001) 
-0.012*** 
(0.002) 
-0.021*** 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
𝜋𝑈𝑆,𝑡 0.004 
(0.025) 
-0.014 
(0.017) 
-0.000 
(0.013) 
-0.020 
(0.014) 
-0.018 
(0.014) 
0.001 
(0.014) 
-0.012 
(0.009) 
-0.035 
(0.031) 
-0.068 
(0.039) 
-0.019 
(0.027) 
𝜋𝑗,𝑡 0.003 
(0.014) 
0.017 
(0.019) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
-0.009 
(0.008) 
-0.004 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.021 
(0.016) 
-0.046*** 
(0.008) 
Δ𝐼𝑃𝑈𝑆,𝑡 0.005 
(0.011) 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
0.000 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.014) 
-0.036 
(0.017) 
-0.002 
(0.012) 
Δ𝐼𝑃𝑗,𝑡 -0.005 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
𝜍𝑒𝑥
2  -0.237*** 
(0.029) 
-0.007*** 
(0.000) 
0.765 
(0.627) 
-0.105*** 
(0.009) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.725*** 
(0.104) 
-0.027*** 
(0.002) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000* 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Δ𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑈𝑆,𝑗,𝑡 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
Δ𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑈𝑆,𝑗,𝑡 -0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 -0.165
*** 
(0.025) 
-0.100*** 
(0.015) 
-0.186*** 
(0.011) 
-0.118*** 
(0.014) 
-0.128*** 
(0.012) 
-0.053*** 
(0.011) 
-0.073*** 
(0.026) 
-0.173*** 
(0.026) 
-0.120*** 
(0.033) 
-0.001 
(0.024) 
𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠,𝑡 -0.132
*** 
(0.028) 
-0.050** 
(0.017) 
-0.177*** 
(0.013) 
-0.065*** 
(0.016) 
-0.119*** 
(0.014) 
-0.037** 
(0.013) 
-0.193*** 
(0.031) 
-0.193*** 
(0.031) 
0.086** 
(0.039) 
-0.081** 
(0.029) 
𝑅2 0.571 0.718 0.639 0.721 0.597 0.350 0.774 0.425 0.316 0.132 
Model (6) controls for common random shocks. Model (7) controls for trade linkages. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are shown between parentheses. 
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Table 4 (continued). Seemingly unrelated regression on time-varying correlation for each country with the U.S. 
Model Variable DE FR UK NL JP CA CN RU IN MX 
(8)        𝛼 0.744*** 
(0.021) 
0.717*** 
(0.012) 
0.745*** 
(0.011) 
0.755*** 
(0.011) 
0.417*** 
(0.012) 
0.781*** 
(0.008) 
0.099*** 
(0.006) 
0.409*** 
(0.022) 
0.333*** 
(0.024) 
0.627*** 
(0.020) 
𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠,𝑡 0.033
*** 
(0.013) 
0.017 
(0.011) 
0.062*** 
(0.009) 
0.013 
(0.010) 
0.039*** 
(0.007) 
0.044*** 
(0.008) 
0.051*** 
(0.006) 
0.140*** 
(0.021) 
0.076** 
(0.025) 
0.019 
(0.018) 
𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 -0.055 
(0.036) 
-0.040 
(0.025) 
-0.021 
(0.020) 
-0.019 
(0.023) 
-0.012 
(0.016) 
-0.033* 
(0.017) 
-0.021 
(0.015) 
-0.068 
(0.048) 
-0.061 
(0.056) 
-0.067 
(0.038) 
𝐿𝐼𝑄_𝑡 -0.306 
(0.205) 
-0.152 
(0.145) 
-0.194 
(0.113) 
-0.167 
(0.134) 
0.130 
(0.092) 
0.027 
(0.097) 
0.092 
(0.084) 
0.086 
(0.271) 
-0.049 
(0.321) 
-0.079 
(0.218) 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠,𝑡 0.411 
(0.239) 
0.276 
(0.169) 
-.298 
(0.131) 
0.324 
(0.157) 
0.012 
(0.107) 
0.044 
(0.113) 
0.059 
(0.097) 
0.437 
(0.316) 
-0.109 
(0.371) 
-0.055 
(0.253) 
Δ𝑀2𝑈𝑆,𝑡 0.023 
(0.020) 
0.015 
(0.014) 
0.012 
(0.011) 
0.021 
(0.013) 
0.004 
(0.009) 
0.025** 
(0.009) 
0.010 
(0.008) 
0.044 
(0.026) 
-0.004 
(0.031) 
0.007 
(0.021) 
Δ𝑀2𝑗,𝑡 0.008 
(0.008) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.027 
(0.014) 
-0.029*** 
(0.009) 
-0.000 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.010 
(0.006) 
𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑡 -0.008
** 
(0.003) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.092 
(0.097) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.015 
(0.010) 
0.133 
(0.416) 
-0.153 
(0.813) 
0.024*** 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.038) 
-1.219 
(4.106) 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑡 0.008 
(0.004) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.195 
(0.151) 
1.418 
(2.602) 
-0.002 
(0.286) 
0.100 
(0.660) 
0.105*** 
(0.038) 
-0.133* 
(0.052) 
0.037** 
(0.012) 
-0.014 
(0.012) 
𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡 0.004 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.069 
(0.136) 
0.004 
(0.002) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.048** 
(0.017) 
0.272 
(0.316) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
0.124 
(0.318) 
0.007 
(0.007) 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡 -0.136 
(0.829) 
0.059 
(0.128) 
0.146 
(0.091) 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.360 
(0.429) 
0.025*** 
(0.003) 
-0.370* 
(0.147) 
-0.119 
(0.073) 
0.005 
(0.013) 
𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 -0.233
*** 
(0.024) 
0.173*** 
(0.016) 
-0.180*** 
(0.012) 
-0.126*** 
(0.015) 
-0.070*** 
(0.011) 
-0.049*** 
(0.011) 
-0.047*** 
(0.009) 
-0.172*** 
(0.030) 
-0.077** 
(0.035) 
-0.010 
(0.025) 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 0.359
* 
(0.149) 
0.180 
(0.104) 
0.074 
(0.081) 
0.087 
(0.096) 
0.005 
(0.066) 
0.172* 
(0.069) 
-0.078 
(0.060) 
-0.188 
(0.195) 
0.419 
(0.227) 
0.143 
(0.155) 
𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠,𝑡 -0.185
*** 
(0.027) 
-0.125*** 
(0.018) 
-0.160*** 
(0.014) 
-0.06***1 
(0.017) 
-0.041*** 
(0.012) 
-0.035** 
(0.013) 
-0.040*** 
(0.01) 
-0.140*** 
(0.035) 
-0.040 
(0.040) 
0.003 
(0.028) 
𝑅2 0.316 0.495 0.542 0.429 0.514 0.211 0.629 0.304 0.219 0.045 
Model (8) controls for financial linkages. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Robust standard errors are shown between parentheses 
Table 5. Two-state Markov regime switching model on time-varying correlation for each country with the U.S. 
Model Variable DE FR UK NL JP CA CN RU IN MX 
High 𝜍2       𝛼 0.689*** 
(0.030) 
0.860*** 
(.004) 
0.754*** 
(.023) 
0.766*** 
(0.016) 
0.512*** 
(0.007) 
0.760*** 
(0.006) 
0.243*** 
(0.004) 
0.447*** 
(0.010) 
0.343*** 
(0.014) 
0.555*** 
(0.048) 
𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑡 -3.868
*** 
(0.325) 
-2.708*** 
(0.135) 
-4.930*** 
(0.409) 
-5.110*** 
(0.334) 
-4.929*** 
(0.170) 
-2.771*** 
(0.219) 
-2.956*** 
(0.090) 
-4.546*** 
(0.261) 
-2.997*** 
(0.379) 
-0.720 
(1.211) 
𝑅𝑜𝑖𝑙,𝑡 0.062 
(0.135) 
-0.017 
(0.024) 
0.143 
(0.095) 
0.003 
(0.090) 
0.021 
(0.040) 
0.209*** 
(0.047) 
0.004 
(0.021) 
0.041 
(0.060) 
-0.152 
(0.089) 
0.105 
(0.242) 
𝑅𝑔𝑜𝑙𝑑,𝑡  0.486 
(0.363) 
0.034 
(0.049) 
-0.178 
(0.277) 
-0.110 
(0.233) 
-0.044 
(0.105) 
0.080 
(0.092) 
0.075 
(0.045) 
-0.193 
(0.141) 
-0.021 
(0.201) 
1.162* 
(0.0589) 
𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 -0.112
*** 
(0.034) 
-0.020*** 
(0.004) 
-0.055** 
(0.027) 
-0.060** 
(0.027) 
-0.045*** 
(0.011) 
-0.063*** 
(0.014) 
-0.014*** 
(0.003) 
-0.042** 
(0.017) 
-0.226*** 
(0.026) 
-0.178*** 
(0.088) 
Low 𝜍2       𝛼 0.845*** 
(0.006) 
0.725*** 
(0.016) 
0.850*** 
(0.005) 
0.850*** 
(0.005) 
0.597*** 
(0.006) 
0.827*** 
(0.008) 
0.152*** 
(0.005) 
0.664*** 
(0.011) 
0.583*** 
(0.021) 
0.622*** 
(0.011) 
𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑡 -1.476
*** 
(0.194) 
-3.869*** 
(0.325) 
-2.887*** 
(0.150) 
-2.936*** 
(0.143) 
-3.406*** 
(0.144) 
-1.452*** 
(0.167) 
-3.752*** 
(0.199) 
-4.248*** 
(0.348) 
-2.34***1 
(0.671) 
-0.318 
(0.355) 
𝑅𝑜𝑖𝑙,𝑡 -0.020 
(0.032) 
0.011 
(0.089) 
0.019 
(0.030) 
-0.024 
(0.029) 
0.015 
(0.031) 
-0.014 
(0.033) 
0.016 
(0.028) 
0.094 
(0.074) 
-0.142 
(0.118) 
-0.033 
(0.076) 
𝑅𝑔𝑜𝑙𝑑,𝑡  -0.001 
(0.068) 
-0.104 
(0.230) 
-0.016 
(0.061) 
0.080 
(0.059) 
0.064 
(0.061) 
0.026 
(0.078) 
-0.046 
(0.065) 
-0.219 
(0.156) 
0.153 
(0.207) 
-0.344** 
(0.145) 
𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 -0.014
*** 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.025) 
-0.022*** 
(0.005) 
-0.020*** 
(0.005) 
0.020*** 
(0.005) 
0.009 
(0.005) 
0.015 
(0.009) 
0.057*** 
(0.010) 
-0.057*** 
(0.015) 
0.008 
(0.011) 
𝜒1
2 8.02 9.30 7.53 20.74 32.30 24.14 8.14 26.49 30.45 4.28 
Dynamic conditional correlations are regressed on investor sentiment and proxies for common random shocks. The 
upper panel provides the estimates in the high volatility regime. The lower panel shows the estimates in the low 
volatility regime.   
  provides the Wad test statistic of the hypothesis that       differs by regime. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Applied Finance and Accounting                                          Vol. 4, No. 1; 2018 
71 
Table 6. Two-state Markov regime switching model on time-varying correlation for each country with the U.S. 
Model Variable DE FR UK NL JP CA CN RU IN MX 
High 𝜍2       𝛼 0.413 
(0.123) 
1.532 
(0.226) 
1.533 
(0.075) 
0.875 
(0.118) 
1.655 
(0.081) 
0.258 
(0.062) 
0.511 
(0.051) 
- 2.808 
(0.354) 
0.575 
(0.159) 
𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑈𝑆,𝑡 -0.004 
(0.001) 
-0.010 
(0.002) 
-0.008 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.013 
(0.001) 
-.0005 
(0.001) 
-0.004 
(0.01) 
- -0.028 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
𝜋𝑈𝑆,𝑡 -0.020 
(0.017) 
-0.001 
(0.012) 
0.013 
(0.011) 
-0.041 
(0.016) 
-0.005 
(0.013) 
0.007 
(0011) 
-0.019 
(0.010) 
- -0.150 
(0.069) 
-0.021 
(0.024) 
𝜋𝑗,𝑡 -0.000 
(0.014) 
-0.091 
(0.013) 
0.008 
(0.008) 
0.010 
(0.009) 
-0.012 
(0.010) 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
-0.020 
(0.004) 
- 0.014 
(0.019) 
0.004 
(0.009) 
Δ𝐼𝑃𝑈𝑆,𝑡 -0.003 
(0.007) 
-0.053 
(0.006) 
0.000 
(0.004) 
0.0007 
(0.007) 
-0.027 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
- -0.034 
(0.023) 
-0.013 
0.011) 
Δ𝐼𝑃𝑗,𝑡 -0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.014 
(0.002) 
-0.009 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
- 0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
𝜍𝑒𝑥
2  -0.217 
(0.016) 
-0.017 
(0.000) 
-3.723 
(0.776) 
-0.149 
(0.009) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0855 
(0.095) 
-0.048 
(0.004) 
- -0000 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
Δ𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑈𝑆,𝑗,𝑡 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
- 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Δ𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑈𝑆,𝑗,𝑡 -0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
- 0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(.001) 
𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 -0.033 
(0.008) 
-0.135 
(0.025) 
-0.132 
(0.009) 
-0.058 
(0.007) 
-0.015 
(0.004) 
-0.046 
(0.007) 
-0.023 
(0.010) 
- -0.166 
(0.043) 
-0.009 
(0.010) 
Low 𝜍2       𝛼 1.557 
(1.163) 
0.87 
(0.117) 
1.245 
(0.512) 
1.274 
(0.0232) 
1968 
(0.135) 
-0.060 
(0.505) 
0.594 
(0.052) 
- 1.712 
(0.180) 
0.741 
(0.176) 
𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑈𝑆,𝑡 -0.010 
(0013) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.008 
(0.005) 
-0.007 
(0.003) 
-0.018 
(0.002) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.001) 
- -0.013 
(0.002) 
-0.006 
(0.002) 
𝜋𝑈𝑆,𝑡 -0.087 
(0.079) 
-0.023 
(0.018) 
-0.047 
(0.064) 
-0.119 
(0.016) 
-0.006 
(0.023) 
0.018 
(0.044) 
0.001 
(0.008) 
- -0.030 
(0.026) 
0.261 
(0.030) 
𝜋𝑗,𝑡 -0.006 
(0.034) 
-0.024 
(0.029) 
-0.064 
(0.027) 
0.200 
(0.021) 
-0.008 
(0.013) 
-0.0233 
(0.028) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
- 0.004 
(0.011) 
0.003 
(0.00) 
Δ𝐼𝑃𝑈𝑆,𝑡 -0.042 
(0.044) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
0.030 
(0.034) 
-0.148 
(0.011) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0019) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
- -0.037 
(0.012) 
-0.080 
(0.010) 
Δ𝐼𝑃𝑗,𝑡 0.001 
(0.011) 
-0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.018) 
-0.013 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0003) 
-0.005 
(0.010) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
- -0.001 
(0.001) 
0.020 
(0.004) 
𝜍𝑒𝑥
2  -0.296 
(0.091) 
-0.009 
(0.000) 
-13.722 
(0.533) 
-0.290 
(0.023) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
1.793 
(0.473) 
-0.053 
(0.002) 
- -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
Δ𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑈𝑆,𝑗,𝑡 0.001 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.0002 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
- -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.008 
(0.002) 
Δ𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑈𝑆,𝑗,𝑡 0.002 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.003 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
- 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.005 
(0.001) 
𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 -0.029 
(0.043) 
-0.058 
(0.007) 
0.144 
(0.019) 
0.007 
(0.010) 
0.065 
(0.022) 
0.060 
(0.022) 
-0.012 
(0.002) 
- -0.041 
(0.010) 
0.006 
(0.023) 
𝜒1
2 10.31 8.93 175.46 12.67 13.23 23.14 6.83 - 9.09 3.51 
Dynamic conditional correlations are regressed on investor sentiment and proxies for trade linkages. The upper panel 
provides the estimates in the high volatility regime. The lower panel shows the estimates in the low volatility regime. 
  
  provides the Wad test statistic of the hypothesis that       differs by regime. Russia is excluded due to 
optimisation issues. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7. Two-state Markov regime switching model on time-varying correlation for each country with the U.S. 
Model Variable DE FR UK NL JP CA CN RU IN MX 
High 𝜍2       𝛼 0.344 
(0.012) 
0.732 
(0.008) 
0.655 
(0.006) 
0.703 
(0.010) 
0.308 
(0.005) 
0.577 
(0.013) 
0.122 
(0.015) 
0.274 
(0.009) 
0.149 
(0.006) 
0.438 
(0.015) 
𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 0.049 
(0.062) 
-0.047 
(0.018) 
-0.032 
(0.016) 
-0.034 
(0.018) 
-0.007 
(0.016) 
0.021 
(0.037) 
-0.017 
(0.017) 
0.041 
(0.024) 
-0.054 
(0.047) 
0.007 
(0.160) 
𝐿𝐼𝑄_𝑡 -0.353 
(0.469) 
-0.058 
(0.045) 
-0.037 
(0.004) 
-0.070 
(0.067) 
0.005 
(0.053) 
0.059 
(0.026) 
0.004 
(0.043) 
0.142 
(0.186) 
-0.225 
(0.166) 
0.327 
(0.406) 
Δ𝑀2𝑈𝑆,𝑡 -0.187 
(0.064) 
-0.012 
(0.007) 
0.010 
(0.004) 
0.012 
(0.009) 
0.001 
(0.009) 
0.007 
(0.024) 
0.018 
(0.008) 
-0.015 
(0.023) 
0.018 
(0.026) 
0.0117 
(0.073) 
Δ𝑀2𝑗,𝑡 -0.002 
(0.012) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.018 
(0.008) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
0.052 
(0.018) 
-0.023 
(0.022) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.007 
(0.026) 
0.002 
(0.016) 
𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑡 0.011 
(0.099) 
-0.003 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
0.098 
(0.035) 
0.029 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.015) 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑡 0.028 
(0.025) 
0.011 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.007 
(0.004) 
0.021 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
-0.373 
(0.067) 
0.077 
(0.111) 
0.019 
(0.038) 
𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡 0.007 
(0.012) 
0.009 
(0.020) 
0.014 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
0.006 
(0.001) 
0.007 
(0.004) 
-0.087 
(0.445) 
0.005 
(0.009) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
0.034 
(0.023) 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡 0.023 
(0.090) 
0.183 
(0.161) 
-0.665 
(0.372) 
0.023 
(0.016) 
0.015 
(0.020) 
-1.875 
(1.781) 
0.051 
(0.048) 
0.337 
(0.117) 
0.378 
(0.193) 
-0.042 
(0.047) 
𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 -0.115 
(0.048) 
-0.024 
(0.005) 
-0.063 
(0.004) 
-0.054 
(0.007) 
-0.049 
(0.008) 
-0.061 
(0.026) 
-0.028 
(0.005) 
-0.067 
(0.019) 
-0.219 
(0.035) 
-0.302 
(0.081) 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 0.232 
(0.544) 
0.014 
(0.070) 
0.023 
(0.050) 
-0.027 
(0.097) 
0.116 
(0.114) 
-0.082 
(0.261) 
0.034 
(0.052) 
-0.012 
(0.016) 
0.759 
(0.468) 
-1.300 
(0.945) 
Low 𝜍2       𝛼 0.618 
(0.012) 
0.477 
(0.016) 
0.440 
(0.025) 
0.482 
(0.019) 
0.222 
(0.017) 
0.763 
(0.007) 
0.055 
(0.007) 
0.536 
(0.007) 
0.402 
(0.023) 
0.606 
(0.017) 
𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 -0.094 
(0.028) 
-0.040 
(0.039) 
0.014 
(0.046) 
-0.027 
(0.051) 
-0.002 
(0.029) 
-0.043 
(0.015) 
0.000 
(0.011) 
-0.079 
(0.043) 
-0.037 
(0.051) 
-0.528 
(0.034) 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡 0.032 
(0.073) 
-0.152 
(0.206) 
-0.313 
(0.217) 
-0.131 
(0.154) 
-0.054 
(0.101) 
-0.087 
(0.048) 
0.004 
(0.036) 
0.067 
(0.110) 
-0.102 
(0.143) 
-0.032 
(0.109) 
Δ𝑀2𝑈𝑆,𝑡 0.030 
(0.013) 
-0.038 
(0.029) 
-0.022 
(0.039) 
0.050 
(0.031) 
-0.007 
(0.015) 
0.018 
(0.008) 
-0.008 
(0.009) 
0.021 
(0.019) 
0.061 
(0.028) 
0.014 
(0.019) 
Δ𝑀2𝑗,𝑡 -0.000 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.014 
(0.012) 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.106 
(0.016) 
0.005 
(0.009) 
-0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.002) 
-0.006 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑡 -0.013 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.030 
(0.07) 
-0.007 
(0004) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.079 
(0.053) 
0.036 
(0.043) 
-0.055 
(0.040) 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑡 0.021 
(0.040) 
0.023 
(0.013) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.010 
(0.012) 
0.043 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.082 
(0.047) 
-0.284 
(0.057) 
0.074 
(0.051) 
-0.004 
(0.012) 
𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡 0.034 
(0.006) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
0.322 
(0.653) 
0.053 
(0.029) 
0.005 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
3.036 
(0.369) 
-0.030 
(0.017) 
0.101 
(0.362) 
-0.013 
(0.095) 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡 -0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.092 
(0.059) 
-0.026 
(0.370) 
0.098 
(0.067) 
0.009 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.019 
(0.004) 
0.569 
(0.285) 
-0.150 
(0.082) 
0.024 
(0.016) 
𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 -0.050 
(0.008) 
0.050 
(0.019) 
0.014 
(0.031) 
0.002 
(0.019) 
0.067 
(0.008) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.015 
(0.006) 
0.033 
(0.013) 
-0.041 
(0.019) 
0.013 
(0.011) 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 0.059 
(0.107) 
0.235 
(0.237) 
0.689 
(0.583) 
0.217 
(0.207) 
0.045 
(0.096) 
0.076 
(0.068) 
0.133 
(0.072) 
0.006 
(0.137) 
0.274 
(0.160) 
0.026 
(0.128) 
𝜒1
2 17.61 14.19 25.12 7.22 96.63 4.69 3.36 18.29 30.43 14.78 
Dynamic conditional correlations are regressed on investor sentiment and proxies for financial linkages. The upper 
panel provides the estimates in the high volatility regime. The lower panel shows the estimates in the low volatility 
regime.   
  provides the Wad test statistic of the hypothesis that       differs by regime. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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